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Abstract
Previous research posits that individual predispositions play an essential role in explaining 
patterns of selective exposure to political information. Yet the contextual factors in the 
political information environment have received far less attention. Using a cross-national and 
quasi-experimental design, this article is one of the first to investigate how political information 
environments shape selective exposure. We rely on a unique two-wave online survey quasi-
experiment in five countries (Switzerland, Denmark, Italy, Poland and the United States) with 
4349 participants to test the propositions that (a) the level of polarization and fragmentation in 
information environments and (b) the type of media source used affect selective exposure. Our 
results reveal that selective exposure is slightly more frequent among regular social media users 
but is less common among users of TV, radio and newspapers; crucially, it is more common in 
information environments that are highly fragmented and polarized. Nevertheless, news users 
from less fragmented-polarized media landscapes show one surprising yet intriguing behaviour: in 
a quasi-experimentally manipulated setting with more opportunities to self-select than they may 
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be accustomed to, their coping strategy is to pick larger amounts of congruent news stories. All 
our findings imply that contextual factors play a crucial role in moderating individuals’ tendency 
to select information that aligns with their political views.
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International comparison, media fragmentation, media polarization, news, political information 
environment, selective exposure
Introduction
Media fragmentation and polarization create a situation where news users are confronted 
with an abundant choice of media outlets that have different ideological leanings. In such 
contexts, audiences may seek out media outlets that best fit their interests and prefer-
ences (Mutz and Martin, 2001), thereby creating their own information cosmos tailored 
to their political predispositions and walling themselves off from any disagreement 
(Sunstein, 2002). While media fragmentation refers to an increase in the number of avail-
able sources of information (Mancini, 2013a) and stands for the actual media choice in 
any given information environment, polarization denotes the level of partisanship and 
ideological extremity of the overall media outlets within such political information envi-
ronments (Fletcher et al., 2019).
In this article, we argue that media polarization and fragmentation at the aggregate 
level provide favourable opportunity structures for people to seek information in line 
with their prior beliefs, that is, selective exposure, at the individual level. Drawing on a 
cross-national survey quasi-experiment on news users from five countries 
(Switzerland = 794; Denmark = 743; Italy = 936; Poland = 965; United States = 911), we 
test whether political information environments with different levels of media polariza-
tion and fragmentation differ in their ability to facilitate individuals’ selective or congru-
ent political information use. We analyse levels of selective exposure through three 
distinct measures: actual, perceived and self-reported selective exposure (Goldman and 
Mutz, 2011; Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng, 2009; Tsfati, 2016). We further investi-
gate whether selective exposure is more frequent among users of more polarizing and 
fragmenting media sources that provide more choice and possibilities of personalization 
(Lazer, 2015), such as social media or newspapers, compared with other media types that 
cater to broader and more politically heterogeneous audiences, such as television and 
radio (Shehata and Strömbäck, 2018; Van Kempen, 2007).
Our findings show that selective exposure is higher in countries with higher levels of 
media fragmentation and polarization across two of our three measures of selective 
exposure. For the participants from less fragmented-polarized political information 
environments – in other words, those who are less accustomed to large partisan selec-
tion options – an interesting behavioural reaction becomes apparent when they are sud-
denly granted a large selection in the quasi-experimental setting: they seek out 
attitude-consistent news in greater numbers than those respondents already accustomed 
to a fragmented-polarized political information environments. Across all groups, we 
find that selective exposure is – to a certain extent – more common among social media 
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users, while it is slightly less frequent among citizens who use TV, radio and also news-
papers as sources of political information. We discuss the implications of our research 
findings in the conclusion.
Selective exposure
Dating back to the 1940s, selective exposure research has a long tradition (Lazarsfeld 
et al., 1944). The phenomenon is widely understood as the tendency to select information 
that is congenial to one’s own individual attitudes and social identities, and its conse-
quences for the democratic process are well documented in the literature (Hart et al., 
2009; Iyengar and Hahn, 2009; Sears and Freedman, 1967; Stroud, 2011; Taber and 
Lodge, 2006).
Whereas seminal studies in persuasive communication argued that increasing selec-
tive exposure trends reinforce individuals’ political predispositions and prevent the 
media from exerting across-the-board effects on people’s cognitions and political atti-
tudes (Iyengar and Hahn, 2009; Klapper, 1960); recent research has demonstrated that 
exposure to congruent information can be indeed highly consequential. For example, 
studies based on the United States showed a polarizing effect of exposure to like-minded 
content (Lelkes et al., 2017; Levendusky, 2013). Selective exposure furthermore reduces 
the frequency with which people discuss politics with non-like-minded others (Iyengar 
et al., 2012). Consequently, selective exposure also has tangible consequences for how 
people perceive their environment: users of opinion-congruent media sources are more 
inclined to assume that public opinion is in their favour (Dvir-Gvirsman et al., 2018; 
Wojcieszak, 2008; Wojcieszak and Rojas, 2011). Overall, the use of congruent political 
information can decrease political tolerance, trigger citizens’ unwillingness to compro-
mise (Stroud, 2011), and leads to the narrowing down of the political agenda to only 
those more divisive issues of the day (Arceneaux and Johnson, 2013).
The question of what drives individuals’ exposure to like-minded or congruent infor-
mation is still unsettled, however (Mutz and Young, 2011). Most studies on selective 
exposure look at either the characteristics of the individuals (e.g. Hart et al., 2009; 
Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng, 2009; Stroud, 2011) or the information source they 
have at hand (e.g. Iyengar and Hahn, 2009; Knobloch-Westerwick and Kleinman, 2012; 
Messing and Westwood, 2014), while research on the contextual factors of selective 
exposure and on the differences in like-minded media consumption across various politi-
cal information environments is still scarce (Castro Herrero et al., 2018; Goldman and 
Mutz, 2011; Mutz and Martin, 2001; Skovsgaard et al., 2016). We elaborate on how such 
environments can shape patterns of selective exposure in the following section.
Selective exposure in different political information 
environments
Results of research on selective exposure so far have mainly originated from case stud-
ies, most of which focus on the United States. Some of these studies argue that a high-
choice media landscape – as it is the case in the United States – facilitates that individuals 
select news closely aligned with their personal preferences (Prior, 2007). However, the 
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United States is a very particular case in point, where TV channels and radio programmes 
with distinct partisan orientations are available alongside a number of partisan newspa-
pers and a vivid number of hyper-partisan online sources. A number of scholars have 
pointed out that the United States is a special case regarding various conditions beyond 
the shape of the media market, such as the political system and cultural peculiarities 
(Nechushtai, 2018; Starr, 2012; Stroud, 2011). This raises doubts as to whether results 
from the US context can be generalized to other countries. The objections are further 
underlined by the finding that context conditions can influence news usage patterns 
(overview: Esser and Steppat, 2017). These and other prior findings on media usage from 
comparative research make it necessary to systematically introduce the concept of the 
political information environment into the research of selective exposure. Van Aelst et al. 
(2017) coin the term political information environment as the ‘supply and demand of 
political news and political information within a certain society’ (p. 4). This concept 
comprehensively captures both the ability of media in a given country to inform its citi-
zenry as well as how the media and the political systems intertwine and impact people’s 
political consumption habits. While digitization processes have enabled recipients to 
select news that is more closely aligned with their personal preferences, not all political 
information environments offer the same possibilities to consume news that follow indi-
vidual preferences to the same extent (Aalberg et al., 2013; Esser et al., 2012). Recent 
research has shown that selective exposure differs depending on the country context 
(Knobloch-Westerwick et al., 2019; Tsfati et al., 2014). Nevertheless, the underlying fac-
tors have received much less attention. Goldman and Mutz (2011) found that cross-cut-
ting exposure – the counterpart of selective exposure – is more likely to occur in political 
information environments that are more closely aligned with the political system. By 
comparing the United States and United Kingdom, as well as newspaper markets in dif-
ferent US counties, Mutz and Martin (2001) found that a more politically aligned media 
environment with multiple news sources fosters attitude-consistent media exposure. On 
the other hand, in countries with a strong public broadcaster, people are exposed to more 
attitude-incongruent political information (Castro Herrero et al., 2018). In this article, we 
propose two key characteristics of a political information environment that provide more 
favourable opportunity structures to select congruent news sources: media fragmentation 
and polarization.
Media fragmentation and polarization as opportunity 
structures
When media environments become increasingly fragmented, audience preferences mat-
ter more to guiding individuals’ choices in media use (Prior, 2007). Mutz and Martin 
(2001) showed that selective exposure is more likely to occur in more fragmented media 
markets where there is more than one information source at hand. By contrast, smaller, 
more saturated media markets are usually characterized by a smaller number of available 
media outlets, which in turn reduce the choice for potential consumers. Overall, media 
users can only select media content to match their own views if there is an ample supply 
of different news sources to choose from and there is no media pulling the majority of 
users.
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Media fragmentation alone, however, is not sufficient for enabling like-minded media 
use. Equally important is the question of what kind of options audiences can ultimately 
choose from. Media fragmentation is frequently accompanied by a specialization of 
media outlets to cater to specific sub-groups of the population (Van Aelst et al., 2017). 
One way of specialization for media brands is to adhere to audiences’ ideological lean-
ings (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010). When media outlets that are close to one’s political 
convictions are widespread, users choose those outlets they anticipate as like-minded or 
congruent, even for non-political content (Iyengar and Hahn, 2009). Outlet specializa-
tion based on political ideology results in a stronger polarization of the media market in 
the sense that media outlets develop closer ties to certain political actors or ideologies 
and middle-ground media outlets lose market shares to partisan media outlets (Fletcher 
et al., 2019; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010; Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Mullainathan and 
Shleifer, 2005; Van Kempen, 2007). In countries with a high degree of media polariza-
tion, citizens are more inclined to choose media according to their political inclination 
(Goldman and Mutz, 2011; Hallin and Mancini, 2004).
Media users may seek out outlets not only because those outlets share their political 
viewpoints but also because others with similar views use those outlets as well. Dvir-
Gvirsman (2017) understands this media-audience homophily as a way for news users to 
strengthen their political group identity and as an act of self-expression. A more politi-
cally aligned information environment helps users choose those outlets that are closer to 
other like-minded individuals and, by extension, to their own political convictions (Mutz 
and Martin, 2001).
Media polarization and fragmentation are hard to separate and hence often go together 
(Van Aelst et al., 2017). Both trends provide more favourable opportunity structures to 
engage in attitude-congruent media exposure. We therefore formulate the following 
hypothesis:
H1: Selective exposure is higher in political information environments with higher 
levels of media fragmentation and polarization.
In addition to the influence of the macro-level factors of media polarization and frag-
mentation, we argue that polarization and fragmentation also play out at the media level 
itself. When it comes to information choices, citizens can choose between different types 
of media sources. These media types vary in the extent to which they contribute to a more 
fragmented and polarized public space (Katz, 1996; Nir, 2012) by allowing their users to 
engage with more specialized content, namely higher amounts of partisan information.
Parallel to the political information environments, Garrett (2009) argues that similar 
factors play out at the level of media source types, with online media allowing the user 
to exercise more control over the content they want to use due to a potentially wider and 
more partisan range of choice compared to other information sources. Consequently, he 
emphasizes that exercising more control over one’s information environment allows 
news users to encounter more opinion-congruent content.
Moreover, we argue that media sources that cater to a broader audience, such as 
many TV channels, offer less opportunities to engage in like-minded news use than 
media sources that address smaller, more homogeneous audiences for different reasons. 
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Primarily, TV programmes are tailored to reach broad segments of the population inde-
pendent of their political convictions (Van Kempen, 2007). By catering for larger and 
by extension more heterogeneous audiences, TV channels also provide more balanced 
content and higher chances to encounter opposing views (Castro Herrero et al., 2018; 
Goldman and Mutz, 2011).
Similar to TV, radio does not allow their users to actively search for specific content, 
but only to watch or listen to a specific programme at a specific time (Clay et al., 2013). 
Obviously, nowadays, also TV and radio are offering asynchronous information through 
online channels, although due to production routines and offline programme scheduling 
their possibilities to tailor programming to specific audiences is still limited. Also, some 
partisan radio programmes – such as political talk radio in the United States (Stroud, 
2008) or religiously affiliated channels in Poland (Krzemiński, 2017) – offer the possi-
bility to engage in selective exposure. However, Clay et al. (2013) stress that even if 
individuals seek out more partisan programmes, this does not give them agency over ‘the 
specific issues and events that will be covered in the broadcast’. Furthermore, other stud-
ies have demonstrated that TV and radio users expose themselves only to a small degree 
to opinion-congruent content (LaCour, 2013).
Previous studies have found that compared to most broadcasting media, newspapers 
offer more opportunities to encounter views similar to one’s own (Goldman and Mutz, 
2011). Newspapers in many European countries originated from party-affiliated press, 
thus providing more politically slanted news than other media types (Hallin and Mancini, 
2004). Although direct bonds with political parties have vanished over time, most news-
papers have kept an ideological profile to distinguish themselves in the market (Van 
Kempen, 2007). This is further corroborated by recent studies finding that newspapers 
are perceived as less hostile and closer to one’s own political convictions than TV (Bachl, 
2016). Nevertheless, newspaper journalism still aims to differentiate itself from other 
non-professional content generators by employing specific journalistic roles and stand-
ards, for example, objectivity and disseminator (Banjac and Hanusch, 2020).
While broadcasting media cannot afford to lose audiences because of higher produc-
tion costs of their programmes, the trademark of most online media is offering more and 
more possibilities for personalization. On social media, there will be no two users with 
exactly the same composition of their news feed because of prior user activities, such as 
clicking on links, following pages and interactions with other users, as well as the setup 
of friend and follower circles and the information provided by the users themselves 
(Lazer, 2015). Whereas some scholars argued that the ubiquity of news on social media 
has increased opportunities for incidental news exposure and learning (Thorson, 2020) 
and exposure to non-like-minded information (Barberá, 2015), previous research also 
shows that the so-called social media logic (Shehata and Strömbäck, 2018) enables indi-
viduals to tailor content to their specific preferences and needs and easily search and 
share opinion-congruent information in unprecedented ways. Social media allows users 
to curate their news feed to their own preferences by following particular news brands 
(Hahn et al., 2015), political actors sharing their ideology (Barberá, 2015) or through 
more homogeneous friend circles (Bakshy et al., 2015). Social media users are more 
fragmented and tend to form ‘communities of interest’ with high inner cohesion (Harrison 
and Wessels, 2005: 837), since frequent exposure to attitude-incongruent information 
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subsequently leads to opinion-congruent information searching and sharing (Weeks 
et al., 2017).
Our study complements previous research that compares selective exposure among 
users of different news media outlets (Goldman and Mutz, 2011; Stroud, 2008) by 
accounting for newer information sources, such as social media, that provide news users 
with more favourable opportunity structures to engage in selective exposure. Drawing on 
the findings presented above, we expect to find the following:
H2: Selective exposure is negatively associated with individual use of TV.
H3: Selective exposure is negatively associated with individual use of radio.
H4: Selective exposure is positively associated with individual use of newspapers.
H5: Selective exposure is positively associated with individual social media use for 
news.
Case selection
We selected our cases to parallel the notion of more and less fragmented-polarized 
political information environments. Despite current political information environ-
ments offering unprecedented opportunities to choose political information and engage 
in news consumption – in particular through new digital technologies that facilitate 
news use – some countries offer more favourable opportunities than others for across-
the-board selective exposure patterns to unfold. By choosing countries that differ in 
terms of the level at which media fragmentation and polarization are prevalent, this 
selection allows us to draw conclusions about the influence of these two phenomena 
on selective exposure.
As a first set of countries, we identified Italy, Poland and the United States. These 
three countries have relatively large media markets that allow news organizations to 
make specialized offerings for different audiences. In the United States, public service 
broadcasting (PSB) traditionally plays only a peripheral role; in Poland, we see an ever 
more similar picture. Furthermore, PSB in Poland and Italy is influenced by government 
and political parties (Esser et al., 2012; Newman et al., 2019). An additional case in point 
for the polarized character of the three countries’ media markets is that partisan news 
sources are strong in Italy, Poland, and the United States (Mancini, 2013b; Mocek, 2019; 
Nechushtai, 2018). In the United States, the success of bluntly partisan media outlets, 
especially in the realms of cable TV, radio and online, reflects on the rising political 
polarization within the country (Hall Jamieson and Cappella, 2008; Iyengar and Hahn, 
2009). In Poland, both public and commercial news outlets are closely entangled with 
political actors (Mocek, 2019); similarly, in Italy, ties between the media and the political 
world remain strong (Mancini, 2009).
The second set of countries, Denmark and Switzerland, share many characteristics as 
well. First, they are both small in size, and to maintain media plurality, the state directly 
and indirectly subsidizes the media sector (Trappel, 2018). The public service broad-
caster traditionally has a very strong position in both countries and is the most frequently 
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used news source for many citizens (Newman et al., 2019). Denmark and Switzerland 
have a history of partisan media, especially in the press (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). 
Nowadays, however, non-ideological media prevail (Marquis et al., 2011; Nord, 2008).
Because countries differ in their levels of media fragmentation and polarization, we 
identified five indicators – three for fragmentation and two for polarization – to illustrate 
our classification and build a calibrated measure. First, fragmentation can be understood 
as a function of the media market size (Lowe and Nissen, 2011). The more sizable a 
national media market is, the better the opportunities are for a larger number of media 
outlets to operate in an economically sustainable way (Picard, 2011). In more sizable 
media markets, partisan media outlets and more independent and balanced outlets exist 
side by side (Gentzkow et al., 2006).
Another indicator for fragmentation is PSB share among national audiences for politi-
cal information. Katz (1996) observes that with the liberalization of the TV market, soci-
eties are in danger of losing social cohesion and becoming increasingly fragmented 
because audiences are being divided into smaller group of users. To secure larger audi-
ences, PSB-based systems are more independent from market demands and more gener-
ously funded (Iyengar et al., 2010). Thus, PSB does not address fringe audiences but 
instead aims at addressing the general public. Where there is a strong PSB, the market is 
more saturated, leaving smaller shares of the audience for other news outlets (Castro 
Herrero et al., 2018; McQuail, 1992). A weak position of the PSB thus indicates higher 
levels of media market fragmentation. Since market share measures differ substantially 
between the countries, we used the weekly audience share of the Reuters Digital News 
Report 2019 as a proxy (Newman et al., 2019).
Understanding fragmentation as lack of a common frame of reference, Nir (2012) 
defined it as the absence of shared news. This indicator differs from the former to the 
extent that shared news is not limited to the PSB but includes other media types as well, 
including online sources. This indicator is important because PSB is not the most used 
source in many countries. There are other media outlets that have an equally catch-all 
approach to inform large segments of the public. According to Nir (2012), a higher pro-
portion of shared news ‘helps larger segments catch up with the news, and facilitates 
fewer disparities between groups’ (p. 581). Based on the Reuters Digital News Report 
2019, we looked at the average weekly usage share of the most frequently used news 
outlet in each of our five countries (Newman et al., 2019).1 Switzerland and Denmark 
demonstrate the highest levels of shared news, with PSB attracting a majority of the user 
population for news (see Figure 1). However, also other traditional legacy media outlets 
engage substantial parts of the user population for news (Newman et al., 2019). On all 
the three indicators, the United States proves to be an extreme outlier and is most closely 
followed by Italy and Poland.
Media polarization is measured through two indicators. First we looked at political par-
allelism because where media outlets are closely related to political parties, selection pro-
cesses based on political ideology are more likely to take place (Goldman and Mutz, 2011; 
Mutz and Martin, 2001). Replicating Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) seminal work on media 
systems, Brüggemann et al. (2014) used data from various sources to provide an empirical 
test for the categorization of media systems. As one indicator to differentiate media sys-
tems, Hallin and Mancini (2004) identify political parallelism. To operationalize this 
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dimension, Brüggemann et al. (2014) looked at different indicators, such as journalists’ 
political attitudes, media content bias and vicinity of media outlets with political parties. 
The standardized coefficients indicate that in Italy and Poland, the media system is most 
closely intertwined with the political system (Brüggemann et al., 2014; Castro Herrero 
et al., 2017). This is represented in Figure 2 with the dark bars.
As a last measure of media polarization, we looked at audience polarization at the 
news outlets level. For this, we calculated the ideological extremity of media outlets and 
how far apart their political alignments are. To this end, we considered the five most used 
media outlets per country for five different media source types (television, radio, print, 
digital-born online news and blogs) and calculated how far the respective audiences 
diverge on average from the population mean in the respective country (Fletcher et al., 
2019).2 We combined these individual scores for outlet extremity into an average diver-
gence score of all the outlets and weighted it by outlet audience share.3 As shown in 
Figure 2, the United States scores highest in media ideological extremity, while Denmark 
and Switzerland show comparatively low values (see the light bars in Figure 2).
Method
Sample
We conducted a two-wave online survey quasi-experiment through an internationally 
renowned market research institute in five countries – Denmark (n = 743), Italy (n = 936), 
Poland (n = 965), the United States (n = 911) and Switzerland (n = 794) – among news 
users aged 18–69 years (N = 4349). The participants had to indicate whether they were 
current residents in one of the five countries to ensure they were being exposed to 
national news outlets. The first questionnaire (wave 1) was sent out in July 2018, and the 
second (wave 2) was sent 4 weeks after to all participants who finished the first wave 
(response rate: 33.3%). The sample is nearly evenly split between females (50.9%) and 
Figure 1. Three indicators of media fragmentation.
(1) Market size refers to the proportion of population above 14 years old that uses news on a regular basis. 
(2) Non-PSB audience refers to the share other (private) TV stations have on the market apart from the 
main PSBs. (3) Non-shared news refers to the proportion of news users not using the main news media 
outlet in the respective countries.
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males (49.1%). The average age is 49 years (SD = 13.9). Most of the participants had 
completed some form of secondary education (47.2%).
Measures
Self-reported selective exposure. To measure selective exposure in the most direct way, we 
used items from Tsfati’s (2016) scale to measure the tendency for selecting ideologically 
congruent political information, and we added additional items for a more comprehen-
sive measurement (see Supplemental Appendix). Tapping into different aspects of expo-
sure to congruent information, the participants indicated how strongly they agreed with 
different statements regarding their use of information sources on a 5-point scale 
(1 = ‘does not apply at all’ to 5 = ‘absolutely applies’). The eight-item scale displayed a 
high reliability score (Cronbach’s α = .839) (M = 2.99, SD = .850).
Perceived selective exposure. We asked the participants to rate all news outlets they report-
edly use on a standard left–right ideological scale (Goldman and Mutz, 2011). These 
scores were later subtracted from the participants’ own self-placement on the same left–
right scale and combined into a mean score index. To facilitate interpretation, we inverted 
the scores, so high numbers indicate high agreement between the political position of 
users and their media sources. The scale, composed of five items, reached an excellent 
reliability (Cronbach’s α = .914) (M = 7.21, SD = 1.731).
Actual selective exposure. Our third selective exposure measure was adopted from 
Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng (2009). We created an online news magazine (see Sup-
plemental Appendix: Figure 4) with eight different articles on four political topics (free 
trade, privacy, migration and penalty reform). The four topics were pretested in a pilot 
study. Each article had a clear stance towards or against the issue at hand. The articles 
were perceived as equally interesting. In the first wave, the participants were asked 
Figure 2. Two indicators of media polarization.
(1) Political parallelism is a standardized measure taking into account the following categories: amount of 
commentary, partisan policy, journalists’ political orientation, media-party parallelism, political bias and PSB 
dependency. (2) Audience polarization takes into account the average distance of the political orientation 
from the audience of the five most used news outlets per media type from the average political orientation 
in each country (as weighted by audience share).
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whether they supported or opposed every issue on a sliding scale ranging from 1 (e.g. ‘I 
see more risks than opportunities resulting from free trade and free markets for our coun-
try’) to 101 (e.g. ‘I see more opportunities than risks resulting from free trade and free 
markets for our country’).4 In the second wave, article selection was unobtrusively 
tracked and later matched with the political attitude towards the issue, resulting in a 
number for consonant and another number for dissonant article choices.5 We subtracted 
the number of consonant articles from the number of dissonant articles and divided the 
resulting number by the total number of articles the participants read. Positive numbers 
indicate a more congruent article choice, while negative numbers stand for a higher 
exposure to dissonant views. On average, the participants tended to select more congru-
ently than dissonantly (M = .10, SD = .541).
Levels of fragmentation and polarization in the media environments. To account for country dif-
ferences, a joint measure of media fragmentation and polarization was constructed using the 
five indicators reported in Figures 1 and 2. For each indicator, we ranked the five political 
information environments according to their values on the five indicators. We calculated a 
mean score index of the five indicators. To facilitate interpretation, we inverted its scores, 
meaning that higher numbers stand for higher levels of media fragmentation and polarization 
(Switzerland = 1.42; Denmark = 1.42; Poland = 3.42; Italy = 4.09; United States = 4.5).
Use of media sources. Media usage was assessed via a dichotomous choice (1 for ‘use’, 0 
for ‘no use’). We asked participants which media source types they have used at least 
once in the past 7 days to obtain information on current political events. They could 
select from four different media source types (TV, radio, newspaper and social media).6 
The participants were free to choose multiple media sources.
Political interest. The participants indicated how interested they were generally in politics 
on a scale from 1 (not at all interested) to 5 (very interested) (M = 3.25, SD = 1.186).
Left–right self-placement. To indicate their political orientation, the participants placed 
themselves on a standard left–right 11-point scale ranging from 1 (clearly to the left) to 
11 (clearly to the right) (M = 6.17, SD = 2.79).
Extremity. Political extremity was obtained by folding the scale for left–right self-place-
ment (M = 2.27, SD = 1.59).
User socio-demographics. We controlled for sex, age and education. Because the educa-
tional systems differ greatly across countries, education was measured through three 
categories: primary, secondary and tertiary education (ESS, 2017; NAES, 2008).
Results
Cross-country differences in selective exposure
We begin with a brief overview of how far-reaching the phenomenon of selective expo-
sure is in the five countries under study. We conducted analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) 
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using the three distinct selective exposure measures as dependent variables to test for 
country differences among our five cases.7
First, we find only a slight preference for selective exposure among all the partici-
pants for self-reported selective exposure (M = .510, SD = .206).8 However, looking at the 
preference for opinion-congruent content by country, we find important differences in 
our self-reported selective exposure measure across the five cases: in Denmark (M = .435, 
SD = .008) and Switzerland (M = .458, SD = .008), individuals’ preferences for pro-attitu-
dinal information sources are significantly lower than those in the other three countries. 
Among participants from the United States (M = .531, SD = .010), Italy (M = .526, 
SD = .007) and Poland (M = .542, SD = .007), the preference for pro-attitudinal informa-
tion is more pronounced (Figure 3, dark grey line).
Second, individuals across all five countries score higher on perceived selective expo-
sure compared with the other two measures (M = .721, SD = .173). This indicates a gener-
ally high level of perceived consonance in the users’ daily news diets. Looking at the 
country differences in the ANCOVA, Polish (M = .762, SD = .006) and US participants 
(M = .768, SD = .008) perceive even more opinion-congruent reporting when they think 
of their most frequently used news sources compared with the other participants (see 
Figure 3, medium grey line).
Third, although the participants chose significantly more often articles that are in line 
with their political attitudes across all countries (M = .553, SD = .263; t(4348) = 12.62, 
p < .001), we find relevant country differences in levels of actual selective exposure. 
Danish (M = .565, SD = 0.011) and Swiss news users (M = .574, SD = .010) were particu-
larly selective in matching their article choice with their political convictions, while 
Figure 3. Cross-country differences for three selective exposure measures (ANCOVA).
Predicted average levels of self-reported, perceived and actual selective exposure by country. All three 
selective exposure measures were rescaled on a 0–1 scale to make them comparable. (1) Self-reported SE: 
F(4, 3448) = 32.44, p < .001, η2 = .036. (2) Perceived SE: F(4, 3080) = 6.32, p < .001, η2 = .008. (3) Actual SE: 
F(4, 3465) = 3.43, p < .01, η2 = .004. Groups with different identification letters (a, b, c) are significantly dif-
ferent according to Bonferroni-corrected post hoc tests (p < .05).
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Polish participants (M = .525, SD = .010) chose news articles that are in line with their 
prior political attitudes significantly less often (see Figure 3, light grey line).
Fragmented-polarized media environments and selective exposure
After this overview, we now turn to Table 1 and the questions of what influence highly 
fragmented and polarized media environments have on selective exposure patterns.9 Our 
hypothesis states that citizens who live in political information environments with higher 
media fragmentation and polarization would show higher levels of selective exposure. 
Our results confirm our H1 (see Table 1)10 that a more polarized-fragmented political 
information environment has a positive influence on participants’ self-reported tendency 
to select congruent information sources over dissonant ones (β = .405, p < .001). As for 
perceived selective exposure, perceived agreement with the position of the media is 
higher in countries with higher media fragmentation and polarization (β = .204, p < .05), 
thus confirming our H1.
So far, the results for the different selective exposure measures display a concordant 
image, providing support for our hypothesis. Interestingly, for the third measurement 
(actual selective exposure), we find a negative coefficient (β = −.047, p < .05). At first 
glance, this unexpected finding implies that the less fragmented-polarized the political 
Table 1. Bootstrapped OLS regression with three selective exposure measures.
Self-reported 
selective exposure
Perceived selective 
exposure
Actual selective 
exposure
 B SE B B SE B B SE B
(Constant) 2.479 .086 9.251 .295 .057 .074
Sex (baseline male) .030 .021 .018† .010 −.012 .021
Age .000 .002 .001 .002 .002* .001
Education .033 .031 .097 .066 −.031** .010
Political interest .033* .013 .057* .026 −.013* .007
Political orientation .004 .005 −.075† .027 .015*** .002
Political extremity .083*** .076 −.655*** .042 .012* .005
Predictors #1 - #4
  #1 Users in more fragmented-
polarized media environments
.405*** .059 .204* .099 −.047* .024
 #2 TV user −.092 .062 −.137 .095 −.066** .024
 #3 Radio user −.014 .023 −.013 .091 −.021* .082
 #3 Newspaper user −.042† .025 −.063 .097 .022 .027
 #4 Social media user .073* .029 −.02 .037 −.017 .011
N 2812 2560 2825
R2 .101 .270 .018
F 299.48*** 804.78*** 51.04***
OLS: ordinary least squares.
Estimates are unstandardized coefficients (B) with standard errors (SE B).
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, †p < .1 (two-tailed).
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information environment from which the respondent originates, the stronger the quasi-
experimentally measured behavioural disposition for attitude-consistent news selection 
is. Put differently, it is the participants from less fragmented-polarized political informa-
tion environments who chose more congruent articles on the mocked news site. To delve 
deeper into this finding, we compared the extent of self-reported selective exposure with 
actual selective exposure through the quasi-experimental condition that was carried out 
in further analyses. A series of t tests confirmed that the average actual selective expo-
sure (M = .566; SD = .265) is significantly greater than self-reported selective exposure 
(M = .435; SD = .202) for individuals in non-polarized countries (t(1201) = 21.725, 
p < .001). This is not the case for citizens in fragmented-polarized information environ-
ments (t(1950) = 1.547, p = .122).11 We will come back to this peculiar behaviour of the 
Danish and Swiss participants in the discussion.12
Turning now to answering H2 and H3, users of broadcasting media engage in less selec-
tive exposure. Results indicate that TV (β = −.066, p < .01) and radio users (β = −.021, 
p < .05) are less likely to engage in actual selective exposure. While contrary to our expec-
tations in H4, also newspaper users self-report slightly less selective exposure (β = −.042, 
p = .09).
Results further show only limited support for the assumption made in H5, that social 
media users are more likely to engage in selective exposure. Only for self-reported selec-
tive exposure, we find that social media users prefer like-minded news (β = .073, p < .05).13
Discussion
In this study, we investigated how widespread selective exposure is among news users in 
five different countries whose political information environments provide different 
opportunity structures to engage in attitude-congruent information choices. Overall, we 
find a general preference among media users for selecting messages that are consistent 
with their attitudes, albeit with different intensities across countries and media types.
First, selective exposure is higher in countries with a more fragmented-polarized 
political information environment, at least when it comes to self-reported and perceived 
selective exposure. Interestingly enough, these perceptions and preferences do not mani-
fest in actual choice. We find that the citizens from political information environments 
that allow for less selective exposure engage in more opinion-congruent source choices 
when given vast opportunities to self-select through a quasi-experimental condition. The 
citizens from Denmark and Switzerland were among those who chose the most attitude-
congruent from all countries. At first glance, this finding may seem surprising. However, 
this is not so if we understand their political information environments as an inhibiting 
factor to exercising congruent media exposure. When given the same conditions as coun-
tries with already more fragmented-polarized political information environments, they 
make greater use of these unprecedented choices. To draw on an analogy from consumer 
behaviour, consider the following: imagine a less fragmented, less polarized political 
information landscape is like a small convenience store where there is a clear product 
range and where the consumer has little product choice. Now, imagine we put the same 
customer of the small convenience store in a big, suburban hypermarket with a variety of 
products never seen before. It is very likely that the convenience store customer will fill 
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his or her shopping cart with all the products he or she cannot find in the convenience 
store around the corner, while the hypermarket regular customer will only take the prod-
ucts he or she always buys.
Second, we looked at different types of media sources that are said to contribute in 
different ways to selective exposure patterns: social media, newspapers, radio and TV. 
Our results provide only limited support for the assumption that audiences of broadcast-
ing media are less selective compared to newspaper and social media users. Our findings 
indeed seem to go in line with recent studies showing that social media allows for some 
degree of cross-cutting exposure through incidental exposure (Barberá, 2015) and that 
online audiences are not necessarily more fragmented than offline news users (Fletcher 
and Nielsen, 2017).
Our analysis is not without shortcomings. Future research may make use of online 
tracking data to look at frequent selective exposure from a greater number of individuals 
in different country contexts (Stier et al., 2020). In addition, our methodological design 
does not allow to test for the potential bi-directional nature of the process at hand, in the 
sense that media use behaviours might not only be influenced by factors in the media 
environment, but that ultimately media use behaviours also influence the way the media 
market is composed. Furthermore, our analysis takes into account the differences in 
media systems, namely the levels of media polarization and fragmentation. There might 
be other factors at play driving the extent of selective exposure at the country level. Other 
studies have identified the differences in the political system or economic setup of the 
media market as predictors for different media use outcomes (Iyengar et al., 2010; 
Wessler and Rinke, 2014).
Our study attests to the fact that research on media polarization and fragmentation can 
serve as a crucial explanatory factor for cross-national research on media use behaviours. 
Three points are important in this respect. First, our study shows that media fragmenta-
tion and polarization are enabling opportunity structures for media users to engage in 
selective exposure.
Second, our study is one of the first to compare the United States with other Western 
countries on a set of three separate measures of selective exposure. Our data support the 
commonly held assumption that selective exposure is relatively high in the United States 
but also reveal that it is not always the highest. We find that citizens from countries with 
more inclusive political information environments are the least likely to engage in selec-
tive exposure in their daily news use. The results speak for the more unifying character 
of certain political information environments, as demonstrated by prior studies (Castro 
Herrero et al., 2018; Nir, 2012), shedding light on the importance to test empirical find-
ings on media use outside the United States.
This brings us to our third point. Our study shows that political information environments 
are important influences for preferences for and perceptions of like-minded news exposure. 
These environments are also influencing behaviours but not as we expected initially. We 
anticipated that a more fragmented-polarized political information environment would have 
a constant and consistent effect on the choice behaviours of news users. When creating equal 
opportunities to self-select under quasi-experimentally manipulated conditions, it is those 
participants who are less able to enjoy an exuberant media selection at home (Switzerland, 
Denmark) who show a stronger behavioural disposition for selecting opinion-congruent 
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information. News users from these two countries, who may be less familiar with lavish, 
highly partisan news sources, are more susceptive to opinion-congruent choices than citi-
zens from countries where these partisan sources can be found in their everyday news use. 
Thus, political information environments matter in people’s media use in three distinct 
ways: by forming preferences, shaping perceptions, and guiding behaviour.
Authors note
Laia Castro Herrero is also affiliated with Universitat International de Catalunya, Barcelona, 
Spain.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/
or publication of this article: This research was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation 
[project grant number: 100017_173286].
ORCID iD
Desiree Steppat  https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2403-9797
Supplemental material
Supplemental material for this article is available online.
Notes
 1. To determine the single most frequently used news source in any given country, we consid-
ered both online and offline news media outlets with the highest reach in each given country 
according to Newman et al. (2019) and selected the news source with the highest audience 
share of weekly users.
 2. We followed Fletcher et al. (2019) in using ideological extremity of different media outlets’ 
audiences to make inferences on media polarization at the supply side. Similarly, we used 
audience share of different outlets as a proxy of media fragmentation, as it is customary 
(Mancini, 2013a). Note that both concepts (audience concentration and polarization) and their 
derived operationalizations are methodologically and substantively different from selective 
exposure. Selective exposure refers to the extent to which people seek like-minded informa-
tion in their frequent media diets, irrespectively of how politically extreme these diets might 
be, and above and beyond other individual factors (issue interest, political sophistication) that 
can lie behind levels of media fragmentation at the aggregate level.
 3. Hence, outlets with low divergence from the population mean and a more sizable audi-
ence weigh more heavily than small outlets with high divergence from the average political 
orientation.
 4. Participants with no clear preference for any side were excluded from the analysis (N = 67).
 5. More information about the quasi-experimental part of this study can be found in the 
Supplemental Appendix.
 6. For TV, radio and newspaper use, we clarified for participants that we did not differentiate 
between news programmes and content that was consumed online or offline. For example, for 
TV use, we asked whether they used news shows on TV (regardless of whether on a TV set, 
media device and/or app).
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 7. All three models are controlled for sex, age, education, political interest, political orientation, 
political extremity and media use. The means used to run analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) 
are corrected by the effect of these covariates.
 8. All three selective exposure measures were rescaled on a 0–1 scale to make them comparable.
 9. We tested whether media fragmentation and polarization have different effects if included 
separately into a regression model. Models with only one of the two predictors (referred to as 
model 1 for media fragmentation and model 2 for media polarization as predictors from now 
onward) have less explanatory power as compared to the models that include both predictors 
combined in an index variable – referred to as model 3 (self-reported selective exposure: 
R2
Model1
 = .057, R2
Model2
 = .060, R2
Model3
 = .101; perceived selective exposure: R2
Model1
 = .139, 
R2
Model2
 = .140, R2
Model3
 = .270; actual selective exposure: R2
Model1
 = .011, R2
Model2
 = .011, 
R2
Model3
 = .018).
10. To account for the small number of level 2 units (five countries), we follow the approach 
suggested by Huang (2018) and estimated cluster bootstrapped regressions with 1000 replica-
tions (clustered on countries) using the bootcov function in the rms: Regression Modelling 
Strategies package by Harrell (2019) in R.
11. As a side note, we add that perceived selective exposure is invariably higher across all 
countries.
12. We have conducted additional analyses to test the individual influence of media fragmenta-
tion and polarization separately. Results reveal that only both factors combined have an effect 
on selective exposure (available from the authors).
13. Additional testing with a split sample revealed no country-specific patterns concerning the 
effect of using different kind of media source types on any of the three selective exposure 
measures.
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